We study the rate of change of the multivariate mutual information among a set of random variables when some common randomness is added to or removed from a subset. This is formulated more precisely as two new multiterminal secret key agreement problems which ask how one can increase the secrecy capacity efficiently by adding common randomness to a small subset of users, and how one can simplify the source model by removing redundant common randomness that does not contribute to the secrecy capacity. The combinatorial structure has been clarified along with some meaningful open problems.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the multiterminal secret key agreement problem formulated by [2] . A group of users, each observing a private correlated random source, discuss in public so they can agree on a secret key. The key is a random variable that needs to be recoverable by every user after the discussion. Furthermore, the key must be secured against a wiretapper who can observe the entire discussion among the users but has no access to their private sources.
The maximum achievable secret key rate is called the secrecy capacity. It was characterized by [2] as a linear program. Because the wiretapper can listen to the entire public discussion, the randomness of the secret key can only come from the information mutual to the private correlated source components. Indeed, in the two-user case, it was shown in [2] that the capacity is equal to Shannon's mutual information [3] :
where each user i ∈ {1, 2} observes the discrete memoryless correlated private source Z i . The mutual information above is written as the divergence D from the joint distribution P Z1Z2 to the product of the marginal distributions P Z1 and P Z2 . In the multiterminal case, let V be the set of (two or more) users, and Z V := (Z i | i ∈ V ) be a random vector where Z i is a discrete memoryless source component privately observed by user i ∈ V . There was a divergence upper bound on the capacity in [2] , which was identified [4, 5] to be tight in the special case without helpers, giving rise to the alternative A longer version of the paper containing proofs can be found on arXiv [1] . C. Chan 
and Π (V ) is the collection of partitions P of V into two or more non-empty disjoint sets. Following [6] , we call (1.2a) the multivariate mutual information (MMI). It is easy to see that (1.1) is a special case of (1.2a) when V = {1, 2}. Indeed, the MMI was formally regarded in [6] as a measure of mutual information among multiple random variables, thereby extending various interpretations and properties of Shannon's mutual information to the multivariate case. The MMI has other operational meanings, ranging from tree-packing [7] , hypergraph connectivity [5] , undirected network coding [8] , vocality constraints [9] [10] [11] , successive omniscience [12, 13] and data clustering [14, 15] .
In this work, we want to study how the MMI of a set of random variables changes with respect to changes in the MMI of a subset of the random variables. We formulate two new problems, called the incremental secret key agreement (ISKA) and decremental secret key agreement (DSKA). In ISKA, a subset of users is given an additional common randomness in the form of a random source of certain entropy rate. The objective is to find an efficient resource allocation, i.e., to increase the capacity as much as possible without requiring too much common randomness to be added to too many users. In DSKA, we remove some common randomness from a subset of users. The objective is to simplify the source model, but without reducing the capacity much. In particular, we want to identify redundant common randomness whose removal does not diminish the capacity. 1 
II. MOTIVATION
We first explain the idea using a simple example. Define the random source as
where X a and X b are independent uniformly random bits. The random bits X j 's determine the correlation, or joint distribution, of the sources Z i 's. Let V := {1, 2, 3} be the set of users. Each user i ∈ V observes the discrete memoryless source Z i privately. It is easy to see that the users can agree on a secret key bit, namely, X a , without any public discussion.
In fact, the users cannot agree on any more secret key bits, even with additional public discussion. This is clear since X a is already the entire private observation of user 3. The secrecy capacity is therefore 1 bit.
For ISKA, we consider adding a common randomness to a subset of users. For example, we may add a new independent bit X c to the private sources of users 2 and 3 as follows:
With such an increment to the private sources, the bit X b can also be used as a secret key in addition to X a , i.e., the secret key can be chosen as K = (X a , X b ). To achieve this, user 2 can reveal in public the XOR F := X b ⊕ X c , and so user 3 can recover X b by subtracting X c from the sum. It can be shown that K is independent of F and is therefore kept secret from a wiretapper observing the entire public discussion. The secrecy capacity is now equal to 2 bits.
In the above, the addition of the private common randomness X c increased the secrecy capacity by 1 bit. If we are allowed to choose who to give this common randomness to, the current choice of users 2 and 3 is in fact the most efficient (besides the equivalent choice of users 1 and 3). For example, if X c were given to users 1 and 2 instead, then it is evident that the capacity would not have increased. Of course, one may choose to give X c to user 1 in addition to users 2 and 3, where the capacity would be 2 bits. However, such an allocation is not considered efficient since additional resources, e.g., private communication, may be needed to give X c to user 1.
For DSKA, we consider removing some common randomness from a subset of users, while trying not to diminish the secrecy capacity. It is easy to see that removing X b from users 1 and 2 does not diminish the capacity, while removing X a from all the users does. 2 In other words, the common randomness X b is redundant but X a is not. We can therefore consider the following simpler source for the purpose of achieving the secrecy capacity of 1 bit:
Simplifying the source is useful because it simplifies the capacity-achieving scheme in [2] by reducing the amount of discussion required for the communication for omniscience.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We will formulate ISKA and DSKA as extensions of the secret key agreement problem in [2] under the source model without wiretapper's side information nor helpers. Readers may refer to [2] for the detailed secret key agreement protocol. In our formulation, we will only need the characterization (1.2a) [5] of the secrecy capacity. In this paper, we primarily denote sets with capital letters, random variables with the sans-serif font, and families of sets with script typeface letters. Furthermore, for a family F of sets, we will use minimal F and maximal F to denote, respectively, the sets of inclusion-wise minimal and maximal elements of F.
A. Incremental secret key agreement
To formulate ISKA, we consider adding a common randomness X of entropy > 0 to a subset S of users:
where X is independent of Z V and has entropy H(X) = . 2 We want to characterize the rate of increase in the secrecy capacity (1.2a) of the incremented source:
The subderivative (one-sided limit)
is the growth rate of the secrecy capacity for the private source Z V with respect to an infinitesimal increment in the common randomness of the subset S. Since the additional common randomness X is a valuable resource, we want to maximize the growth rate among all subsets S of the same size as in
for integer k. We refer to ρ + k as the growth rate of order k. 2 For an efficient allocation of common randomness, we want to identify small subsets with strictly positive growth rate:
to denote the set of all critical edges. 3
2
(We remark that a critical edge S is an edge in the (S, )incremented source.) Out of all the critical edges, the subsets with minimum size require the least resource. It is easy to argue that the minimum critical edges are the optimal solutions to (3.3) for the smallest k such that ρ + k (Z V ) > 0.
B. Decremental secret key agreement
To formulate the DSKA problem, we will consider a special kind of random sources:
We say that a source Z V has an edge S ⊆ V if there is a common randomness X that is observed only by the users in S, i.e., if we can rewrite Z i (up to bijection) as
5)
where Z V is independent of X . We reduce such a source to the following (S, )-decremented source by removing an ∈ (0, H(X )] amount of common randomness X :
for some common randomness X independent of Z V and with H(X) = H(X ) − .
2
Contrary to ISKA, we are interested in the rate of decrease in the secrecy capacity (1.2a):
Definition 3.5 The subderivative (one-sided limit)
is the loss rate of the secrecy capacity for the private source Z V with edge S.
Unlike ISKA, we are interested in edges S with zero loss rate.
Definition 3.6 S ⊆ V is said to be an excess or redundant edge if the corresponding loss rate is 0 for the source Z V with edge S. In this case, we can simplify the secret key agreement by removing common randomness of the edge S without diminishing the secrecy capacity.

IV. MAIN RESULTS
As pointed out by [8, 20] and elaborated in [6] , the MMI can be computed in polynomial time using submodular function minimization [21] algorithms. A polynomial time algorithm was also given by an earlier work of Fujishige [22, 23] for a more general type of submodular functions and set family. It turns out that the characterization and computation of the growth rate, loss rate, critical edges, and excess edges depend only on the optimal partitions that attain the MMI (1.2a). The set of the optimal partitions will be denoted by
(4.1)
Using the combinatorial result of [24] , the set Π * (Z V ) ∪ {V } forms a lattice, and hence admits a unique finest partitionm
Here, the minimum is with respect to the partial order "≺" of the partitions, which is defined as P ≺ P if the partition P is finer than (or a refinement of ) the partition P . In other words, P can be obtained by further partitioning one or more subsets in P . Following [6] , we will refer to the finest partition P * (Z V ) as the fundamental partition. This partition has an elegant interpretation [14] in data clustering, and furthermore, can be computed in strongly polynomial time using algorithms such as [25] applied to the minimum average cost clustering.
For ISKA, we can characterize the growth rate and critical edges using the optimal partitions as follows:
where χ is the indicator function of the condition specified in the subscript. It follows that
In other words, S ⊆ V is critical iff it is a minimal set that overlaps at least two blocks of every optimal partition. 2 Indeed, S crit (Z V ) depends on Z V only through the coarsest optimal partitions in Π * (Z V ). This is because, if S crosses a partition, i.e., overlaps at least two blocks of the partition, then it must also cross any refinement of the partition. For DSKA, we can similarly characterize the loss rate and excess edges as follows:
It follows that S is an excess edge iff
i.e., S does not cross the fundamental partition.
2
The condition for an excess edge depends only on the fundamental partition, and therefore can be checked in strongly polynomial time. Equations (4.3a) and (4.3b) imply the following simple properties of ρ + k (3.3) and S crit .
is non-decreasing in k and equal to 0 for k ≤ 1. Furthermore,
the size of the fundamental partition. Finally, we have at least one critical edge, i.e. S crit (Z V ) = ∅, and the minimum size of a critical edge is at least 2, i.e., min{|S| | S ∈ S crit (Z V )} ≥ 2. 2
Computing ρ + k in general can be quite difficult but some simple cases will be given in the next section. Surprisingly, it turns out that computing a minimum critical edge can be done in strongly polynomial time, which is due to the result below. Indeed, a stronger result can be proved. We will characterize the critical edges completely using only the maximal blocks from the optimal partitions,
which can also be computed in strongly polynomial time.
More precisely, we can show that:
Lemma 4.1 Either one of the following cases happen:
for some U ⊆ V . In words, either T max (Z V ) is an optimal partition or its complementT max (Z V ) is a set of at least two non-empty disjoint subsets of V . Indeed, (4.6) means that T max (Z V ) is the unique coarsest optimal partition. 
which is taken to mean the collection of the sets
. It follows that |T max (Z V )| is the size of all the critical edges. 
There is a unique optimal partition and so T max Indeed, (4.6) may hold even when the optimal partition is not unique. For instance, consider V = {1, 2, 3} and let Z 1 := (X a , X b , X c ), Z 2 := (X a , X b , X d ) and Z 3 := (X c , X d ) where X i 's are uniformly random and independent bits. It follows that
which satisfies (4.6) but T max is the coarsest partition rather than the fundamental partition. 
where X i 's are independent uniformly random bits. The optimal partitions in Π * (Z V ) are shown in Fig. 1b , and
is not an optimal partition,T max (Z V ) = {{4}, {1}}, which satisfies (4.7). By (4.9), the set of minimum critical edges is S crit (Z V ) = {{1, 4}}. It crosses at least two blocks of every coarsest optimal partition, and therefore every optimal partition. Example 4.2 is a special case of the pairwise independent network (PIN) source model [26] , where in this example the source is simply a tree, see Fig. 1a . For tree PINs in general, it can be argued that a partition P ∈ Π (V ) is optimal iff each block C ∈ P induces a tree on C. For example, the optimal partition {{1, 2}, {3, 4}} in Fig. 1b induces two subtrees, one connecting 1 and 2, and the other connecting 3 and 4. Thus, the fundamental partition is always the partition into singletons, but it is not the only optimal partition for |V | ≥ 3. Nevertheless, we can show that there is only one critical edge and such an edge is equal to the set of leaves. 2
V. COMPUTING THE GROWTH RATE OF DIFFERENT ORDERS
In this section, we will illustrates the computation of ρ + k in (3.3). There are simple cases where ρ + k (and therefore S crit ) can be computed easily. For example, in the special case when the fundamental partition is the unique optimal partition, i.e. |Π * (Z V )| = 1, it can be argued easily from (4.3a) that
where an optimal solution S to (3.3) is any set of k elements, each from a different block of the fundamental partition. In particular,
and so all the critical edges are minimum with size 2. When the partition into singletons is the unique optimal partition, then the optimal solution S to (3.3) is simply any k-subset of V .
In particular, the singleton partition is shown to be the unique optimal partition in [9] for any PIN model that corresponds to a complete graph. We can also show the same result for any PIN model that corresponds to a cycle. In general, it is possible to check in strongly polynomial time whether the fundamental partition is the unique optimal partition. For instance, in Example 4.1, the optimal partition is unique and all the critical edges have size 2 as expected. More details about the computation and interpretations of the fundamental partition can be found in [6] . When the optimal partition is not unique, ρ + k (Z V ) may not be linear in k. The marginal increase in growth rate may not be diminishing in k either. This is the case, for instance, for Example 4.2 as shown in Fig. 1c .
If H(Z B ) is an integer for every B ⊆ V , then ρ + S (Z V ) can be computed in strongly polynomial time. To argue this, choose = 1 |V |! . Note that I P (Z V )/ is an integer and so I P (Z V ) for different P ∈ Π (V )\Π * (Z V ) is larger than I(Z V ) by at least , while I(Z S, V ) is larger than I(Z V ) by at most .
. Each term on the R.H.S. can be computed in strongly polynomial time. A more refined argument suggests that one can choose any ≤ 1 (|V |−1)(|V |−2) .
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have formulated the ISKA and DSKA problems to study how the MMI of a set of random variables changes with respect to an infinitesimal increment and decrement in the MMI of a subset of the random variables. We found that the set of opimal partitions that attain the MMI of a set of random variables completely characterizes the growth rate for ISKA and the loss rate for DSKA.
For ISKA, the growth rate can be computed easily in some special cases, e.g., when the optimal partition is unique. In general, however, it is not clear whether the computation can be done in polynomial time. The growth rate can be non-linear in the order, and the marginal return may even increase as we increase the order. Very surprisingly, however, a minimum critical edge can be computed in strongly polynomial time because all critical edges have the same size. In other words, one can easily identify a minimum subset of users to give an additional common randomness to, such that the secrecy capacity strictly increases. For DSKA, the condition for an edge to be redundant can be characterized in strongly polynomial time using the fundamental partition. Identifying excess edges is useful in simplifying secret key agreement schemes. In particular, it is hopeful that further investigation can resolve the conjectures regarding the communication complexity for secret key agreement [17] [18] [19] .
